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Lewis: A Preferred Position for Journalism?

A PREFERRED POSITION FOR JOURNALISM?
Anthony Lewis*
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the news media." That was the clarified version of the

first amendment 1 proposed by Justice Stewart in his memorable
1974 address at the Yale Law School, Or of the Press.2 Most parts
of the Bill of Rights, he said, protect liberties whoever exercises

them; but the press clause of the first amendment is "a structural
provision"3 protecting a particular institution:

press," 4

"the organized

which Justice Stewart defined as "the daily newspapers

and other established news media."5 Journalism, in short, has a

special constitutional status, with rights not available to others. 6

The Yale speech broke important new ground. The Supreme

Court had never really addressed the question posed by Justice
Stewart-whether the press clause has an independent purpose
and meaning-much less given his bold answer. The press clause,

he said, did not merely join with the speech clause to guarantee
freedom of expression to all; that would make it "a constitutional
redundancy." 7 Rather, the "primary purpose" of those who framed
it was "to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches." 8 That purpose,

Justice Stewart said, informed recent Supreme Court decisions on
the rights of the press. 9
* Columnist, the New York Times. Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. B.A.,
1948, Harvard College.
1. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted, except for opening courtesies, in Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631
(1975).
3. Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).
4. Id. at 631, 632. Justice Stewart also speaks oT "the established press." Id. at
632.
5. Id. at 631.
6. One who disagrees with the idea has described it, fairly enough, as a
"preferred position for the press as an institution." Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974,
997 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev'd, 99 S.Ct. 1635 (1979). For the origin
of the phrase "preferred position," see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
7. Stewart, supra note 2, at 633.
8. Id. at 634.
9. Id. at 635.
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The media' 0 welcomed the message. In recent years, news organizations, both print and broadcast, have become increasingly
sensitive to perceived legal threats and increasingly determined
to define their rights in the courts. The more aggressive mood
no doubt stems in part from the experience of Vietnam and
Watergate, which weakened the old premise of shared beliefs and
mutual respect between press and government." A growing sense
of professionalism, fed by journalism schools and journalism reviews and press councils, also adds to journalism's pride of place.
The news business in this country is now quick to use the law as
both sword and shield. The last two terms of the Supreme Court
alone have seen battles about access to news,12 searches of news
premises, 13 protection of confidential sources,' 4 and the confidentiality of the editorial process., 5 I think Justice Stewart's
speech contributed to the determination of news organizations to
fight those cases, and to the legal doctrines advanced by their lawyers.
The speech is also finding its way into judicial opinions. It
was cited in the Second Circuit's short-lived decision in Herbert v.
Lando, 16 which gave aspects of the editorial process protection
from discovery in a libel case; the dissenter, Judge Meskill, wryly
responded that he would not take such a step "on the basis of a
single speech, even one given by Mr. Justice Stewart."' 17 Chief
Justice Burger, in a case dealing with the free speech rights of corporations, wrote a concurring opinion to express a skeptical attitude toward "those who view the Press Clause as somehow

10. "Media" is a word ordinarily to be avoided in civilized discourse. Alas,
there is no way to escape its use in discussing whether "the press" whose freedom is
guaranteed by the first amendment favors journalism over other forms of publication.

11. A leading article in the wake of the Pentagon Papers Case, New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), said publication of the papers

"demonstrated that much of the press was no longer willing to be merely an occasionally critical associate [of the government] devoted to common aims." Edgar &
Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73
COLUM. L. 11Ev. 929, 1077 (1973).
12.

See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (access to pretrial

suppression hearing); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (access to prison),
13.

See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

14. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978).

15. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1635
(1979).
16. Id. at 977 n.11 (citing Stewart, supra note 2, at 633).
17. Id. at 997 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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conferring special and extraordinary privileges or status on the 'institutional press.' "18 If provoking judicial colleagues is one sign of
effect, and it is, Justice Stewart can rest content with the impact of
his Yale speech.
But in the end the Stewart thesis of press exceptionalism-of a
preferred status for journalists-will succeed or fail in the
marketplace of constitutional ideas. It should be tested there by
three standards: its roots in history, its basis in the decided cases,
and its wisdom in principle. By those tests I find it unconvincing.
HISTORY

"For centuries before our Revolution," Justice Stewart said in
his Yale speech, "the press in England had been licensed, censored, and bedeviled by prosecutions for seditious libel. The . . .
free press meant organized, expert scrutiny of government. The
press was a conspiracy of the intellect, with the courage of numbers. This formidable check on official power was what the British
Crown had feared-and what the American Founders decided to
risk."19
Those words are an admirable tribute to the romance of journalism and to its high duty. But as history designed to prove that
the first amendment gave special status to the news media, the
passage is less convincing. For "the press" that was licensed and
bedeviled in England was not newspapers alone. Those who called
for "freedom of the press" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had in mind books and pamphlets and all kinds of occasional
literature as much as newspapers. Indeed, some were not thinking
of newspapers at all.
The most famous statement on behalf of press freedom in that
period was John Milton's Areopagitica.2 0 Published in 1644, it was
an attack on the requirement that any printed work be read and licensed by official censors before publication-a requirement first
established by the Crown in 153821 and reimposed by Parliament
18. First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice did not actually cite Justice Stewart's speech, but it was
plainly his target. He has cited it in support of the argument that the press has no
constitutional right of access to government information. Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,

438 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978). See text accompanying notes 151-155 infra.
19.

Stewart, supra note 2, at 634.

20. J.

MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (J. Dent ed. 1946).
21. F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 48-49

(1952).
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in a statute of June 14, 1643, after the Puritan Revolution. 2 2 Milton
argued that "regulating the Press" 2 3 could be accomplished by
means less onerous than the licensing system. By "the Press" he
meant any product of a printing press; at one point, for example,
he ironically sympathized with the conscientious censor who must
be "the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets, oft24
times huge volumes."To say that books and pamphlets were at issue in the long
English debate about freedom of the press is to argue the obvious.
The royal licensing system was first imposed by Henry VIII after
the invention of printing had, as one leading commentator puts it,
magnified the danger of "opinions deemed pernicious." 2 5 That was
in 1538, before the development of newspapers. The classic history
of the long struggle, Frederick Seaton Siebert's Freedom of the
Press in England, 1476-1776, cites the Levellers' petition to Parliament of January 18, 1649, as an outstanding statement of the argument for press freedom; the petition made its case in terms of
books and pamphlets. 2 6 Siebert also shows that well into the eighteenth century pamphlets as well as newspapers were the subject of
prosecutions for seditious libel: A bookseller was tried in 1752 for
27
publishing a pamphlet critical of the House of Commons.
A scholarly brief filed in the 1978 Term of the Supreme Court
by Floyd Abrams 28 and others relied on the Siebert book to demonstrate that many newspapers were published in England before
1776 and that they were a frequent object of repression. 2 9 The
brief also showed that American newspapers played a significant
role in arousing anti-British feelings before 1776.30 Hence, it concluded, "the framers of the Constitution knew what the press was,
knew how crucial a role it could play."31 True enough. But no one

22. Id at 173.
23. J. MILTON, supra note 20, at 40.
24. Id. at 20.
25. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 8 (1960).
26. F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 200-01.
27. Id. at 383. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LiTERA-

TUBE 911-15 app. (4th ed. 1967) (Censorshipand the Law of the Press).
28. See generally Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice
Stewart and the Autonomous Press,7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979).
29. Brief for Respondents at 49-50, Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
30. Id. at 50-51.
31. Id. at 51. But the very material cited in the brief, from A. SCHLESINGER,
PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE (1958), shows compellingly that the American press in

that period was far from the provider of "organized, expert scrutiny of government"
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argues that the eighteenth-century concept of "freedom of the
press" did not include newspapers. Justice Stewart's suggestion,
rather, is that the concept was applied exclusively to newspapers.
No historian of whom I am aware has produced any evidence to
support that proposition.
The precise motives of those who drafted the speech and press
clauses of the first amendment are unlikely to be discovered now,
if indeed they were ever ascertainable. Madison sponsored in the
House what became the first amendment, and another amendment
that would have prohibited state abridgment of press and other
freedoms; the latter was killed in the Senate. 32 Committee
changes, unexplained in the materials left to us, 33 reduced the language to its final compelling simplicity: "Congress shall make no
34
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
The most natural explanation seems the most probable: The
framers wanted to protect expression whether in unprinted or
printed form. Freedom of the press was more often mentioned in
colonial and state bills of rights than freedom of speech; at the time
of the first amendment ten state constitutions protected the former
while only two the latter. 3 5 Very likely, as Chief Justice Burger has
said, press freedom "merited special mention simply because it had
been more often the object of official restraints." 36 But the two
phrases were used interchangeably, then as now, to mean freedom
of expression. And there is evidence suggesting that eighteenthcentury Americans, when they thought about the rights of speech
and press, regarded them as aspects of the same fundamental personal freedom. George Mason began drafting the Virginia Declara-

portrayed by Justice Stewart, Stewart, supra note 2, at 634. Professor Schlesinger

said the press "trumpeted the doings of Whig committees, publicized rallies and
mobbings, promoted partisan fast days and anniversaries, blazoned patriotic speeches
and toasts, popularized anti-British slogans." Brief for Respondents at 50, Herbert v.
Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979) (quoting A. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 46). In short, the
press in those days was highly partisan. And that character continued after indepen-

dence and after the formation of the United States. While Jefferson was Secretary of
State in the Washington administration, for example, he employed a journalist to at-

tack Washington's Federalist Party. Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 90 (1975).
32. E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 5-6 (1963) (citing
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432, 435, 778 (Gates & Seaton eds. 1789)).

33. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799 n.4 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
34.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

35. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 183-85.
36.

First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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tion of Rights, which included a striking assertion of the need for
freedom of the press, 3 7 just two days after Dixon and Hunter's

Virginia Gazette of May 18, 1776, carried the following on its front
page:
[The liberty of the press is inviolably connected with the liberty
of the subject ... [.]
The use of speech is a naturalright, which

must have been reserved when men gave up their natural rights
for the benefit of society. PRINTING is a more extensive and im-

proved kind of speech.3 8

In sum, the Stewart thesis of a preferred position for the news
media finds no support in history. Those who wrote the first
amendment were familiar with newspapers. But there is no evidence that they meant to limit the freedom of "the press" to newspapers, excluding books and other publications, or that they intended to afford newspapers a higher standard of protection than
other forms of expression.
THE

DECIDED CASES

In his Yale speech, Justice Stewart said four groups of recent

Supreme Court decisions reflected an understanding that the free
press clause was "a structural provision of the Constitution," protecting "an institution."3 9 His list was headed by the series of libel
cases starting with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 40 in which the
Court held libel actions by government officials subject to constitutional limitations. Officials are ordinarily immune from suit for
what they say in the line of duty, Justice Stewart said, to encourage vigorous performance of their functions. He argued that the libel cases applied the same reasoning to the press. "By contrast,"
he said, "the Court has never suggested that the constitutional
right of free speech gives an individual any immunity from liability
for either libel or slander."41

This explanation of Times v. Sullivan is, well, breathtaking.
Justice Brennan's great opinion for the Court in that case began as
follows: "We are required in this case to determine for the first
37. Mason's first draft of the Virginia Declaration, a committee draft, and the final version are set out in H. MILLER, GEORGE MASON: GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY 337-40 apps. (1975).
38. Va. Gazette, May 18, 1776, at 1, col. 2 (emphasis in original), quoted in H.
MILLER, supra note 37, at 148 (1975).

39. Stewart, supra note 2, at 633 (emphasis in original).
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Stewart, supra note 2, at 635 (emphasis in original).
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time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech
and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action
42
brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct."
Not a word in the opinion intimated independent reliance on the
press clause, or application of the new libel rule to media defendants only. Indeed, the decision reversed libel judgments against
not only the New York Times but also four individual defendants,
43
Alabama clergymen.
Justice Brennan drew an analogy to the official immunity
doctrine quite different from that suggested by Justice Stewart. Officials, he said, were immunized against damage suits that might
dampen their ardor "'in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' "4 He continued: "Analogous considerations support the
privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty
to criticize as it is the officiars duty to administer."45 Not "the organized press" but "the citizen-critic"--which in philosophical
terms is a pole apart. The vision that informs Times v. Sullivan is
that of Alexander Meiklejohn, who saw free speech on public issues as the absolute right and duty of all citizens in a selfgoverning society.4 6 It is a vision of democracy, Steven Shifflin has
said, not "mediaocracy."' 47 Professor Shiffrin is surely right in saying that Justice Stewart's explanation "does violence to the language and underlying philosophy of New York Times Co. v.
48
Sullivan."
42. 376 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 256, 286. A year later the Court summarily reversed a libel judgment
won by a Mississippi police chief from a civil rights leader who, on being arrested, issued
a public statement saying that his arrest was "a diabolical plot." See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 356 (1965). The facts are given in more detail in Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 4, Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
44. 376 U.S. at 282 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46.

See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoUiTicAL FREEDOM (1965). The belief that

Meiklejohn's vision informed Times v. Sullivan led Professor Kalven to hope that it
would prove to be the most important Supreme Court opinion "in the realm of freedom of speech." Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 194.
47. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915, 923 (1978).
48. Id. at 922. It should be added that there is some question now whether
there is a constitutional difference between media and nonmedia publishers of defamatory statements about purely private persons. The Court dealt with libel of private persons in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The defendant in
Gertz was a magazine publisher, and Justice Powell's opinion for the Court spoke of
"the press and broadcast media," id. at 343. But the Court did not indicate whether
the rule there established, that private libel plaintiffs must show at least negligent
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Second, Justice Stewart found support for the idea of press exceptionalism in the Supreme Court's close division in Branzburg v.
Hayes.49 There, a five-to-four majority rejected claims for a journalist's privilege not to disclose confidential sources, holding that
reporters were required to appear before grand juries to testify at
least about crimes they had witnessed. If only a free speech claim
had been at issue, Justice Stewart suggested, the question "would
have answered itself. None of us-as individuals-has a 'free
speech' right to refuse to tell a grand jury the identity of someone
who has given us information relevant to the grand jury's legitimate inquiry. Only if a reporter is a representative of a protected
institution does the question become a different one." 50
But suppose a college lecturer refused on first amendment
grounds to answer a congressional committee's questions about his
beliefs and associations. In that somewhat analogous situation the
Supreme Court also divided five to four, rejecting the lecturer's
claim. 51 Or suppose a professor visited Vietnam during the war,
talked with American officials on the basis that he would not disclose their names, wrote a scholarly paper on the war-and was
then called before a grand jury and asked the identity of his
sources. 52 Would a claim of confidentiality on his part be utterly
without weight because he is not a member of "the organized
press"? I think many journalists would be uncomfortable with a
doctrine of testimonial privilege that included them and excluded

publication of a damaging falsehood to recover, would apply to suits against nonmedia defendants. The American Law Institute has rejected any distinction, saying it
would be "strange." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B(e) (1977). A
number of state courts have similarly rejected any distinction between media and

nonmedia defendants in libel actions by private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Jacron Sales Co.
v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
50. Stewart, supra note 2, at 635 (emphasis in original).

51. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
52. See United States v. Doe, 460 k'.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 909 (1973). Popkin, an associate professor of government at Harvard, was im-

prisoned for contempt when he refused to answer certain questions before a grand
jury investigating the distribution of the Pentagon Papers. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,

1972, at 1, col. 1. The president of Harvard appeared as his counsel, and one week
later the grand jury's term was ended and Popkin was released. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 1. For an instance of a judge protecting a scholar from forced
disclosure in a civil case-on nonconstitutional grounds-see Richards of Rockford,
Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (declining to enforce,

on discovery, demand by plaintiff in civil damage action that third-party academic researcher identify sources of material in scholarly paper on defendant company).
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others with similar reasons for silence. In any event I doubt that,
for most judges, the question would "answer itself."
Third, Justice Stewart cited cases in which the Supreme Court
had rejected claims of access to the press by outsiders. 53 In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 54 the Court unanimously held

unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring newspapers to publish a
reply submitted by any candidate for office whom they had criticized. Justice Stewart correctly described the decision as rejecting
the idea that government may force a newspaper to be a "fair and
open 'market place for ideas.' "55 But that holding does not imply a
distinction between the speech and press clauses of the first
amendment. Government can no more require a speaker than a
newspaper to be neutral. Justice Holmes' opinions on freedom of
speech introduced the concept of the market in ideas, 56 and it was
Holmes' point that the most extreme or hateful beliefs must be allowed to compete in that market. 57 His is now the accepted
58
view.
In Professor Nimmer's view, Tornillo in another sense did
demonstrate that free speech and press can be distinct, even conflicting interests. 59 The Florida law enhanced the right of candidates to speak, he said, but infringed the freedom of the press by
compelling publication; thus the two rights were directly in conflict
in that case. But the vice of the law lay in the compulsion to publish; and I think the result would be no different if the case involved a compulsion to speak. If a state statute required any candidate who spoke falsely about another to make a corrective speech,
would it survive challenge under the first amendment?
The last example given by Justice Stewart of cases assertedly
reflecting the special character of the press clause was New York
53. Stewart, supra note 2, at 633, 635.
54.

418 U.S. 241 (1974).

55. Stewart, supra note 2, at 635.
56. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
57. "[f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1,197 (7th Cir.) (ordinances enacted by village of Skokie, Illinois, to prevent march by
American Nazis held unconstitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
59. See Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy: What
Does it Add To Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hastings L.J. 639, 644-46 (1975).
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Times Co. v. United States,60 the Pentagon Papers Case, in which
the Supreme Court refused to restrain newspaper publication of secret documents on the history of the Vietnam war. The per curiam
opinion said that the Government had not met the heavy burden of
"61
justification for" '[any system of prior restraints of expression.'
The doctrine disfavoring prior restraints was established by the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,6 2 a newspaper case. But cases rejecting restraints on publication are not limited to the news media; many have concerned books and pamphlets. The per curiam opinion in the Pentagon Papers Case itself
relied on a recent decision setting aside an injunction that kept a
community organization from distributing literature criticizing a
real estate broker for "blockbusting."-6 3 One of the seminal first
amendment decisions of the 1930's, Lovell v. City of Griffin," set
aside a conviction for distributing pamphlets without a city permit.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said the freedoms of
speech and press were "fundamental personal rights."6 5 Citing the
history of the English struggle against press licensing, with a mention of Milton, 66 Hughes said: "The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets .
"67
, The city manager's unlimited power to allow or
forbid the distribution of pamphlets, he said, "strikes at the very
foundation of the freedom of the press."68 The Lovell case was
relied upon in Talley v. California,6 9 which held unconstitutional a
Los Angeles ordinance that forbade the distribution of handbills
unless they included the names of their authors and distributors.
60.

403 U.S. 713 (1971). See Stewart, supra note 2, at 635.

61. Id. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
The separate opinions of the six Justices in the majority actually gave two different
bases for the judgment in favor of the newspapers. Five Justices relied in whole or
part on the prior-restraint doctrine. Five relied in whole or part on the fact that Congress had not authorized the injunctive relief sought by the Government, or had indeed rejected legislation to authorize it: a separation-of-powers basis, as in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a view that the
Youngstown point really decided the case, see Junger, Down Memory Lane: The
Case of the PentagonPapers, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3 (1971).
62. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
63. 403 U.S. at 714 (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)).
64. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
65. Id. at 450.
66. Id. at 451 (citing J. MILTON, APPEAL FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING).

67. Id. at 452.
68. Id. at 451.
69. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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Justice Black's opinion for the Court, in which Justice Stewart
joined, emphasized the value of anonymous books and pamphlets
70
in English and American history.
Nor is the prior-restraint doctrine limited to publications; it
also protects freedom of speech and assembly. In Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham,7 1 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
for parading without a permit. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of
the Court. The city permit ordinance was so vague, he said, that it
gave officials virtually unbridled discretion. Thus it fell "squarely
within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last
30 years" against laws "subjecting the exercise of First Amendment
2
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license."7
Case law, then, draws no line between "the organized press"
and other publications-books, pamphlets, handbills-in their right
to freedom of the press. Nor do the cases distinguish the quality of
freedom assured to the press and to speech. Of course there are
practical distinctions between speeches and publications, and between newspapers and books; and the law takes them into account.
But as the decided cases show, they are distinctions without a difference in constitutional principle. No Supreme Court decision has
held or intimated that journalism has a preferred constitutional position.
PRINCIPLE

The practical consequences of the Stewart thesis, if it became
accepted constitutional doctrine, would not be as beneficial to journalists as many of them believe. And the thesis is against the real
iriterest of the press, and of society, for deeper reasons of principle.
The whole idea of treating the press as an "institution" arouses
uneasy feelings. In the American system, institutions are usually
subject to external check. The press has operated as a freebooter,
outside the system. The more formally it is treated as a fourth
branch of government, the more pressing will be demands that it
be made formally accountable. 73 Moreover, as Robert M. Kaus has
70. Id. at 64-65.
71. 394 U.S. 147 (1969); accord, Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496 (1939).
72. 394 U.S. at 150-51.
73. The following statement is illustrative: "The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged
but not always observed by editors and publishers." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
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suggested, the institutional view of the first amendment envisages
a corporate organization of society, with groups assigned different
roles and corresponding legal rights. The traditional American vision has been universal, positing a society of individuals with equal
rights and responsibilities: 74 Justice Brennan's citizen-critics. 75
Who Is the Press?
If a majority of the Supreme Court accepted the proposition
that freedom of "the press" in the first amendment gives special
status to the news media, the next question would be: Who is "the
press"? Would the definition be limited to Justice Stewart's "established" newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters? Could it exclude
underground papers? Journals of sexual exploitation? A sheet of viciously racist tone, like the new weekly at issue in Near V.
Minnesota?76 In the age of the electronic copier, what about the
citizen moved by outrage at some local development to circulate
his or her views among neighbors? Or what of a specialty publication such as a Wall Street tip sheet: Could the Securities and Exchange Commission regulate it without violating the freedom of
77
"the press"?

These questions are not fanciful. They would inevitably arise,
and they would force the courts to go into the business of defining
"the press," of deciding who qualified for the higher constitutional
status. Justice White foresaw the problem in his opinion for the
Court in Branzburg. Selecting those entitled to a journalist's constitutional privilege, he said, "would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order."78 In making the selection, courts
would be drawn into "discriminating on the basis of content."79
427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). The opinion, by Chief Justice Burger, made that appeal for
self-restraint in the context of a holding that the courts could not, except in the most
extreme circumstances, enjoin publication of a story that might affect the opinions of
jurors in a pending criminal case.
74. Kaus, The Constitution, the Press and the Rest of Us, VASH. MONTHLY,
Nov. 1974, at 50, 52. As an example of the universalist outlook, Kaus refers to the
rule of one man, one vote. Id.
75. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
76. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Only nine issues of the Saturday Press, the newspaper
in Near, were published. Id. at 703. The paper's antisemitic character is made clear
in Justice Butler's dissent. Id. at 724 n.1 (Butler, J., dissenting).
77. See SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970)
(requiring investment advisory newspaper to register under Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-1 to -21 (1976), does not violate first amendment).
78. 408 U.S. at 703-04.
79. Id. at 705 n.40.
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Would the media really welcome this new form of judicial
licensing?
Some supporters of the Stewart thesis, perhaps recognizing
the risks in its exclusivist character, have tried to make it more appealing by broadening its definition of "the press." In Herbert v.
Lando, Judge Oakes, while relying explicitly on Justice Stewart's
speech, said he would not draw any "distinction between the institutional press and the individual pamphleteer." 80 Floyd Abrams, in
his Supreme Court brief for the media respondents in Herbert,
embraced that position; the press clause of the first amendment, he
said, fully covered "the lonely pamphleteer.""'. But if the definition
is thus broadened, then any publication becomes "the press" and
Justice Stewart's thesis loses its point. His argument was that the
first amendment has special meaning for the news media.
The Danger of Exclusivity
The danger of exclusivity was demonstrated when Justice
Stewart applied his thesis in literal terms to a case before the
Court. The case was Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.s2 A majority held
that authorities could search a newspaper office under warrant
-that is, without notice or a prior adversary hearing-for documentary evidence of a crime committed by other parties. Justice
Stevens dissented on the ground that notice should ordinarily be
required before such a search of any third party: one not suspected
of crime. 83 Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by Justice
Marshall, dissented on the ground that the search violated the
freedom of the press. He wrote:
Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office
should receive no more protection from unannounced police
searches than, say, the office of a doctor or the office of a bank.
But we are here to uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution
80. 568 F.2d at 994 n.34 (Oakes, J., concurring).
81. Brief for Respondents at 55-56, Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979)
(citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
82. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
83. Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Some immediate scholarly comment
agreed with Justice Stevens' view of the case. See Harv. L. Rec., Sept. 29, 1978,
at 5, col. 1 (comments of Professors Freund and Katz). The Stevens argument is the
more compelling because the opinion of the Court failed to discuss a central fact
noted by the dissent: that when the Court first allowed searches for "mere evidence," in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967), it was dealing with the evidence of a criminal suspect's clothes; it left open the more sensitive question of documentary evidence.
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does not explicitly protect the practice of medicine or the business of banking from all abridgment by government. It does ex84
plicitly protect the freedom of the press.

In Justice Stewart's view, then, the Constitution forbids the
unannounced search of a newspaper office for photographs of a felony; but it allows the police, without notice, to search a psychiatrist's files,8 5 or Ralph Nader's. 8 6 I think such a concept of the

Constitution would be quite unacceptable to most Americans. The
Constitution protects values, not particular classes of people. And
the values are not limited to those listed by name in the Constitution; if the significance of that eighteenth-century document were

limited by such literalism, it would long since have become a
87

museum piece.
If attention is focused on the rights of the organized press,

damage to other vital first amendment interests may occur without
adequate awareness or resistance. Relatively little outcry was heard
when the Fourth Circuit developed the doctrine that in my judgment presents the most serious threat in American constitutional

history to public knowledge of government: the secrecy-by-contract
doctrine of United States v. Marchetti."" Because he had signed a
secrecy agreement upon joining the agency, a former official of the
Central Intelligence Agency was enjoined from publishing a book
on CIA activities without the agency's prior censorship. 8 9 When
84. 436 U.S. at 576 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
85. The example is not hypothetical. See A Justice Dept. Memo Says Liddy and
Hunt Raided Office of Ellsberg's Psychiatrist,N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
86. Nader would apparently be covered by legislation suggested by the Carter
administration six months after the decision in Zurcher. The proposal was to prohibit searches by either state or federal officers for the work product of anyone
preparing a publication or speech for dissemination in, or affecting, interstate commerce. The work product would include notes, drafts, outtakes, photographs, tapes,
and files. The Justice Department said its intention was to cover not only the news
media but scholars, freelance writers, and pamphleteers. See Lewis, A Blow for Liberty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1978, at A31, col. 1.
87. The word "reputation" is not found in the Constitution, but Justice Stewart
once said that reputation has weight in the constitutional scale because it reflects
"our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being."
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
88. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
89. The court found the secrecy agreement to be a legally enforceable contract,
which it said took the case out from under the prior-restraint rule that had just been
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971). 466 F.2d at 1316-17. It did not discuss the need, suggested by Supreme
Court cases, see, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-08 (1959), to find explicit authorization by Congress for executive action that raises serious constitutional
doubts.
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the agency made massive deletions and the author sought judicial
review, the court gave the CIA virtually unreviewable discretion
to delete any passage that it said contained information classified
during the author's employment. 90 He was also enjoined for the
'91
rest of his life from disclosing such information "in any manner.
In a subsequent case 92 the United States sued another former
CIA employee who had already published a book; the Government did not allege that he had disclosed any classified matter; but
it claimed, and was awarded, damages because he had failed to submit the manuscript to the agency for clearance.
Those decisions have had much less attention in the news media than cases involving journalists, although they present direct
and profound threats to the core purpose of the first amendment:
keeping the public aware of what its government does. And the
journalist-centered view of the first amendment may well reduce
the legal prospects of a Victor Marchetti. The insistence that a particular class has special immunities under the first amendment is
likely to suggest to judges that persons outside that class are of a
lower order of constitutional concern.
The idea that the news media are constitutionally unique may
also encourage hubris, the excessive pride that goes before a fall.
Powerful newspapers and networks are not universally beloved as
it is; there is talk about the arrogance of the media. Ordinary citizens may find it hard to understand why the press should have
rights denied to them. And in the long run, rights depend on public understanding and support. 93 Professor Bork has put it succinctly: "To the degree that the press is alone in the enjoyment of
freedom, to that degree is its freedom imperilled." 94

90. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975). The book was published with blank spaces for the censored
passages. V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKs, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
(1974).
91. The text of the injunction appears in Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 83a app., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
92. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, No. 78-1651 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1979).
93. Vermont Royster of the Wall StreetJournal has said:
That first amendment we cherish is not some immutable right handed down
to Moses on Mt. Sinai. It's a political right granted by the people in a political document, and what the people grant they can, if they choose, take away.
There is no liberty that cannot be abused and none that cannot be lost.
Royster, Reflections on the FourthEstate, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1978, at A19, col. 1.
94. R. Bork, Freedom, the Courts and the Media 13 (Dec. 8, 1978) (address to
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The Right to Gather News
One legal issue has become the focus of the debate about a
special constitutional position for journalists: the claim that the first
amendment affords a right to gather news, and stemming from that
a testimonial privilege to protect the confidentiality of news
sources. It is this claim that journalists have lately been pressing
with the greatest fervor, and that for some critics raises the
sharpest questions about press exceptionalism. 95
The issue was dramatized, for press and public, in In re Farber.9 6
M.A. Farber, a reporter for the New York Times, was assigned in
1975 to follow up a tip about thirteen suspicious deaths in a New
Jersey hospital a decade earlier. 9 7 On the basis of interviews with
confidential sources, he wrote articles suggesting that "Dr. X" had
poisoned the patients with curare. The local prosecutor reopened
the case, and Dr. Mario Jascalevich was charged with five murders.
At his trial in 1978, Dr. Jascalevich's lawyer subpoenaed all
the notes Farber had made in reporting the story in 1975 and
1976. He and the Times both declined to produce the notes,
claiming a privilege under the first amendment and under a New
Jersey shield law for journalists. 9 8 At a minimum, they argued,
they should not have to respond to such an indiscriminate subpoena; the defendant should have to show that particular items
were likely to be relevant, material, and unobtainable by other
means. 99 The trial judge ordered the notes delivered to him for examination in camera, a process he said was necessary to pass on
the legal arguments. 10 0 When the Times and Farber declined to
the William 0. Douglas Inquiry into the State of Individual Freedom), reprinted in
CENTER MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr. 1979, at 28, 34.
95. Royster has warned that
[w]e should be especially wary of claiming for ourselves alone exemptions
from the obligations of all citizens, including the obligation to bear witness
once due process has been observed. There is nothing in the Bill of Rights,
including the first amendment, that makes the press a privileged class apart.
The risk is that the people may think us arrogant.
Royster, supra note 93, at A19, col. 1.
96. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
97. For the history of Farber's involvement, see An Almost Routine Assignment
Led to HistoricCase, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1978, at B8, col. 1.
98. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979-1980).
99. Brief for Appellants at 31-35, In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77, 394 A.2d 330, 338,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
100. State v. Jascalevich, No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 30, 1978) (oral
opinion of Arnold, J.).
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obey that order, they were held in contempt. The Times was fined
$100,000, plus $5,000 for each day it remained in contempt. Farber
was fined $1,000, ordered to jail until he changed his mind, and,
in addition, given a six-month sentence for criminal contempt to
begin when he complied with the order or when the case was resolved.101
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, 10 2 holding that the
first amendment argument had been rejected in Branzburg10 3 and
that the state shield law, while in terms protecting Farber, had to
yield to the New Jersey constitutional provision assuring defendants the right to compel evidence on their behalf.10 4 In deference
to the legislature's intent in enacting the shield law, the court
agreed that a particularized showing of need was required to force
production of a journalist's notes, even for purposes of in camera
inspection; 10 5 but it said the facts were so obvious in this case
that the judge did not have to bother with the requirement. 10 6
Farber had been in jail forty days, and the Times fined $285,000,
by the time the trial ended in Jascalevich's acquittal. The further
0 7
six-month prison sentence was then dropped. There is much to criticize in the performance of the courts in
the Farber case. A rule requiring a particularized showing should
apply in all cases, not every case except the one in which the rule
is laid down. If a newly enacted statute squarely supports a claim
of testimonial privilege, those who rely on it in good faith surely
should not be imprisoned and subjected to huge fines unless and
until an authoritative decision holds the statute void. Farber himself asserted no absolutes and sought no clash with the law; when
he went to prison, on grounds of principle, he said: "I deeply appreciate how much our civilization, and civility, depend on order
and the rule of law."108 Yet he was treated in the state courts with
a rigor seldom shown to thieves, and a federal judge verbally

101. In re Farber, No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 24, 1978) (oral opinion of
Trautwein, J.).
102. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978).
103. Id. at 266-68, 394 A.2d at 333-34 (discussing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972)).
104. Id. at 269-74, 394 A.2d at 335-37 (citing N.J. CONST.art. 1, 10).
105. Id. at 275-77, 394 A.2d at 338.
106. Id. at 277-81, 394 A.2d at 339-41.
107. See Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1978, at Al, col. 2.
108. Farber, Statements by Farberand the New York Times, N.Y. Times, July
25, 1978, at B6, col. 4.
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abused him without basis in fact or any effort to discover the
facts.106 Farber deserved respect. 110 But that is not the same as
saying that his was the only side to the case.
During the proceedings the Executive Editor of the Times,
A.M. Rosenthal, issued a statement saying:
Mr. Farber and The Times have been fighting this case because they feel it goes to the heart of the constitutional guarantee of the first amendment. It has always been believed that the
first amendment guarantees the right not only to print the news
freely but to gather it freely. It is quite plain that without the
right to gather information, the right to print it means little. We
believe the right to gather information will eventually be destroyed if any branch of government, including the judiciary, has
the right to seize and make public a reporter's notes, confidential information and raw material.'11

Many in the news business share those views, but they are not
the law-or the fact. Two professors of journalism, under a grant

from a journalism-based foundation, recently made historical studies of the claim that the first amendment guarantees the right to

109. United States District Judge Frederick B. Lacey, after a brief hearing on a
petition for habeas corpus, made findings that, among other things, "'Farber has a
stake in the conviction of Dr. Jascalevich ....This is a sorry spectacle of a reporter
who purported to stand on his reporter's privilege when in fact he was standing on
an alter [sic] of greed .... What he did here is ...evil ....' Application to Vacate
Stay of Single Justice at 17, New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 886
(quoting United States District Court Judge Lacey), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
Judge Lacey's statements were based upon conclusions he erroneously drew from
Farber's intention to write a book. The judge seemed to believe that the book contract, which was before him, made Farber's remuneration dependent upon the conviction of defendant Jascalevich; it did not. See Response of The New York Times
Company and Myron Farber to Application to Vacate Stay at 1-7 app., New York
Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 886, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), which
demonstrates that the "findings" were made in the absence of any evidence or in
contradiction of the record. In my opinion, the transcript presents a sorry spectacle of
judicial abuse.
110. Professor Ronald Dworkin, in an article arguing that Farber, in seeking a
privilege, asserted interests of public policy that had to yield to the rights of the defendant, nevertheless praised Farber and the Times for raising the issues. He added
that the New Jersey courts were unreasonable in jailing Farber and making the
Times "pay punitive daily fines while their legal arguments were pending before appellate courts." Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber,N.Y. REv. BooS, Oct. 26,
1978, at 34, 36. Dworkin challenged the relevance of Farber's book contract, criticized by Judge Lacey. Id. at 36 n.*. For a further decimation of the book-contract red
herring, see Kwitny, A JudicialWar on the Press?, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1978, at 12,
col. 4.
111. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at A15,col. 6.
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12

gather news.1 One wrote that he was "sad to say there is no evidence" to support the claim." 3 The other concluded: "I can't think
4
of a more dubious proposition for a journalist to try to support.""i
No Supreme Court decision has ever enforced a constitutional
right to gather news. Without such a right, the American press has
performed more boldly and with greater freedom than any other
press in the world. Judicial inspection of subpoenaed material in
camera cannot accurately be described as seizing material and making it public; judges routinely examine trade secrets, national security records, and other sensitive matter to decide on its use, and
they keep confidences. Nor is it accurate in this country to speak of
courts as an arm of the state. They often stand against the state;
they have stood up even to its highest officer. In United States v.
Nixon," i 5 the President asserted a privilege to withhold tapes of intimate White House conversations subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a qualified privilege based on the Constitution" i6 but held that it was overridden
112. The studies, sponsored by the Gannett Foundation, were made by Professors Don R. Pember of the University of Washington and Harold L. Nelson of the
University of Wisconsin. Articles by them were published, together with a comment
by Professor Donald M. Gillmor of the School of Journalism, University of
Minnesota, in BULL. Am. SoC'Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec./Jan. 1979, at 6-9. A leading newspaper writer on questions of journalism commented:
The verdict of the professors will not end the claims of news people that the
gathering of news must have special protection if the press is to serve effectively as the public's watchdog and informer. But it should put to rest any illusion that the position of the current Supreme Court is just an aberration-Nixon's Revenge, some journalists call it-and that all that is needed
is a return to the thinking of the Founders.
Seib, The Right to Publish (and Gather?) News, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1978, at A13,
col. 1.
113. Pember, Founders (meeting in secret) protected our right to publish,
but not to gather the news, BULL. AM. SOC'Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec./Jan.
1979, at 6. Professor Pember wrote that a "right to gather news" was not discussed at
the time of the first amendment's adoption, or for years after, for a simple reason:
Consider the "newspapers" of that era. News-gathering was hardly a
prime function. These were papers of opinion and ideas. .

.

. News-

gathering, reporting, access to government information as we speak of it today was not really an important part of the American press of that era. It is
not surprising then that that concept was not considered a part of the definition of freedom of the press. (Reporting, per se, really didn't begin to be important until the 1830's.)
id.
114. Nelson, Separating the inseparable? Linking news-gathering with publishing called 'dubious,' BULL. Am. Soc'Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec./Jan. 1979,
at 7.
115. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
116.

Id. at 705-06 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. II).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

19

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Hofstra
Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1979], [Vol.
Art. 37: 595

by the particularized needs of law enforcement.'1 7 Not even the
argument that an adverse decision would cripple the Presidency" 18
persuaded the Court to reject the claims of law. Most editors applauded the Nixon decision."19 They should be slow to argue that
the press will be crippled unless its claims of privilege always
prevail.
Law and common sense both reject the notion that journalists
alone in the society have an overriding constitutional claim to secrecy. Their interest is a serious one. But in the real world it must
inevitably be balanced against other interests. That is plain if one
considers how the courts would feel-how the public would feel,
indeed-if various parties sought the same ihformation that Farber
had. The balance of interests would vary.
Suppose, for example, that a congressional committee subpoenaed Farber's notes and that he declined to produce them, relying
on the first amendment. If the committee had only a general interest to justify its inquiry, Farber would surely have a good chance
of persuading a court not to sustain a contempt citation. In Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,'2 0 Justice Frankfurter, who did not treat state
interests lightly, concluded that the state's asserted desire to investigate subversion had to yield to the claims of academic
freedom-to the political privacy of a university lecturer. 1 1 In
such a balance, I believe Farber's interest would be just as
weighty.
Next, suppose a grand jury sought Farber's notes. Branzburg
indicates that he would have to produce them unless he could
show, in the words of Justice Powell's concurring opinion, that his
information was "remote"' 22 from the subject of the investigation
or that he would be forced to disclose confidential sources "without
a legitimate need of law enforcement." 23
Finally, suppose a journalist's notes were sought by a defendant, as Farber's were-a defendant, moreover, who found himself
117. Id. at 706-07.
118. Counsel for President Nixon argued that an adverse decision would "impair markedly the ability of every President of the United States from this time forward to perform the constitutional duties vested in him," and would "alter the nature of the American Presidency profoundly and irreparably." Brief for Respondent
at 135, 137, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
119. See, e.g., The Court Speaks, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1974, at 32, col. 1.
120. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
121. Id. at 265-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
122. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's concurrence was
crucial because he provided the fifth vote.
123. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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in the dock largely because of articles by Farber. A defendant has
an unusually explicit constitutional right to compel evidence on his
behalf. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor .
"124 And a reporter's notes could be useful. Witnesses
sometimes change their stories, and a reporter's record of what a
prosecution witness said years before about the defendant could be
vital for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. That was the
principle ofJencks v. United States,12 5 holding that in federal prosecutions the defense must be allowed to see prior statements made
by witnesses to the government. When a defendant seeks information from a journalist with genuine knowledge of the case, there
are strong interests--constitutional interests-on the defendant's
side. Those who assert a press privilege would win more respect
1 26
for their position if they admitted as much.
The outcome of the Farbercase evoked some cries of doom in
the press. 127 Theodore H. White, in an article headed "Why the
124.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

125. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), was passed
to codify and limit the Jencks decision. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1861.
126. It is sometimes said that denial of a journalist's privilege is inconsistent
with the granting of a privilege to lawyers and others. Kwitny wrote that journalists
"are now being denied privileges commonly accorded to private lawyers, doctors,
priests and so on." Kwitny, supra note 110, at 12, col. 4. In Farberthe New Jersey
Supreme Court did not explain, and should have, why it honors those privileges
when created by statute, but held the shield law unconstitutional to the extent that it
would deny a defendant relevant evidence; any privilege, after all, keeps out evidence. But I think there is an explanation. The older privileges are for the benefit
not of the doctor or lawyer or priest, but of the patient or client or penitent, who
alone can waive the privilege. Each of these persons is a defendant or prospective
defendant, and the privilege in these situations is akin to the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination: It protects a defendant from having a private confession used by the state, as if he had been tricked into incriminating himself. The journalist's privilege is designed not to protect an individual but to advance
the general public interest in the flow of information.
But the differences between the claimed journalist's privilege and others do not
justify judicial disrespect for a legislature's decision to extend a privilege to newsmen. A disturbing feature of the Farberdecision was the abrupt way in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court brushed aside a considered judgment of its legislature.
The court might, for example, have accommodated the defendant's interest and the
public interest found by the legislature by holding that the prosecution of Dr.
Jascalevich must be dismissed unless Farber produced his notes for in camera inspection. At a minimum, the court might have discussed that and other possible accommodations of the statute and the Constitution. After all, in Branzburg the Supreme Court pointedly invited state legislatures and Congress to enact journalists'
shield laws if they found that conditions so required. See 408 U.S. at 706.
127. But see Royster, Minority View on Newsmen's Rights, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 16,
1978, at 22, col. 4. Royster wrote: "What we in this craft must guard against is a
knee-action reflex that anything we find inconvenient or annoying is somehow a vio-
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Jailing of Farber 'Terrifies Me,' "128 said the files that he had accumulated in forty years as a journalist would now be at the mercy of
"any politician styled 'judge.' "-129 If the Supreme Court let the
Farber decision stand, he said, "I should at once go back to my
files and start burning up my old notes." 130 As an example of the
danger, White wrote: "Had the jurisprudence that threw Farber
into prison prevailed in 1974, the attorneys of Messrs. Mitchell,
Haldeman and Ehrlichman could have demanded that [Bob]
Woodward and [Carl] Bernstein give up their notes and so reveal
the identity/identities of 'Deep Throat' or go to jal."' 31 But the
"jurisprudence" did exist in 1974. Branzburg had been decided in
1972,132 and counsel for the Watergate coverup defendants were

intelligent and determined enough to make use of it if it had promised to be helpful. Counsel did not subpoena the Washington Post
reporters' notes because they obviously included no information
significant to that trial, and a subpoena would not have been enforced.
Confidential sources are unquestionably crucial, these days, to
a high function of the press: exposing abuse in our institutions.
There is no real chance of discovering wrongdoing in the CIA133
unless an insider decides to talk, and usually he does so only on
condition that his name not be used. But it does not follow that the
press will find no confidential sources unless it has an assured testimonial privilege not to name them in court. In Britain the press
has no such privilege and operates in general under stringent legal
inhibitions;' 34 yet the serious newspaper with the largest circulation, the Sunday Times, produces outstanding investigative relation of the first amendment. There are too many real battles to be fought for freedom of speech and of the press." Id.
128. White, Why the Jailing of Farber "Terrifies Me," N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
129. Id. at 84.
130. Id. The Court did. Has he burned his notes?
13f. Id. at 76.
132. To be precise, Branzburg was decided on June 29, 1972. That was 12 days
after the break-in at Democratic party headquarters in the Watergate. It has always
seemed to me extraordinary prescience that Justice White included this observation
in his opinion: "In United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (C.C. Va
1807), Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, opined that in proper circumstances
a subpoena could be issued to the President of the United States." 408 U.S. at 688
n.26.
133. See, e.g., Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces,
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8 (by
Seymour M. Hersh).
134. British restrictions on the press are canvassed in Evans, The Half-Free
Press, in THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Granada Guildhall Lectures 1974).
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ports. 135 The idea of a testimonial privilege under the first amendment was not even raised in this country until 1958;136 reporters
managed to function without it. My guess is that most confidential
sources talk to the press for their own compelling reasons of conscience or ideology or personal animus-and will continue to do so
even if an occasional case demonstrates that reporters may come
under legal pressure to name their sources.
A publicized case like Farber's will of course inspire some defense lawyers to try the gambit of press subpoenas. 137 But judges
are capable of dealing with lawyers who abuse the process. 138 In
this country, as in Britain, the number of reporters who have actually gone to jail to protect their sources for genuine pieces of investigative reporting is very small.' 39 And one can hardly argue that
the number of press reports based on confidential sources is decreasing. Theodore White said there "would have been no exposure of the My Lai massacre had it not been for the ability of a
brave reporter to persuade a handful of men in the United States
Army to tell the truth."' 40 But that premier investigative reporter,
Seymour M. Hersh of the New York Times, does not believe that
the denial of a legal privilege to the press has made it harder to get
confidential information.' 4 ' It would be different, very different, if
135. See, e.g., SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), THE THALIDOMIDE CI-LDEN AND
THE LAW (1973).
136. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972). The 1958 case in which
the claim was first raised is Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958). Justice Stewart, then a Sixth Circuit judge, but sitting by designation with the Second, wrote the opinion.
137. Subpoenas of Notes of Reporters Grow, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1978, § 1, at
38, col. 1.
138. One judge has noted: "'Lawyers are beginning to abuse the privilege of
requiring newspaper reporters to come in with their notes and to testify. This is not
the function of a newspaper reporter, not the function of the court.'" 3 Newspaper
Reporters to Comply with Subpoenas to Testify on L.I., N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1979, at
B2, col. 5 (quoting Judge Joseph Jaspin of New York Supreme Court).
139. According to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, since
1972 at least 12 reporters have gone to jail for refusing to disclose confidential
sources and information. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Reporters Taken into Custody (Apr. 18, 1979) (internal compilation on file in committee's
Washington, D.C., office). But this compilation includes a number of reporters who
were imprisoned for violating a court order against disclosure of grand jury minutes
and refusing to tell the court where they had obtained the minutes-action that
hardly rises to the level of genuine investigative reporting.
140. White, supra note 128, at 76.
141. I do not see any sign that reporters are finding it any more difficult to
get secret information and documents now than before the Farber case. In
fact, for the past ten years-when the issue of sources and concern about judicial decisions was developing-we have seen a steadily escalating volume
of leaks.
Statement by Seymour M. Hersh to the Author (Dec. 1, 1978).
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a government set out to expose the sources of embarrassing newspaper stories for political reasons, as has happened in South
Africa. 142 But any such attempt in the United States would be
fought in the courts and beaten. Nothing
in Branzburg or Farber
3
allows exposure for exposure's sake.14
The privilege cases have brought from some corners of the
press strident attacks on the motives and character of judges. After
the decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, a columnist wrote that
"one of the worst Supreme Courts in our history" had "delivered
an atrociously un-American ruling."' 144 During the Farber case a
Wall Street Journal reporter commented: "The judiciary-certainly
not all of it, but enough of it to lay down the law-has for all practical purposes declared war against the press."'145 Is such hysteria
supposed to increase respect for the press' judgment? Only someone unfamiliar with the overwhelmingly conservative history of the
Supreme Court 46 could describe the current Court as "worst" in
first amendment terms. Only someone unwilling to look at the recent record of major press victories in the law 147 would be silly
enough to talk of a judicial war on the press.
It seems especially ill advised to picture the courts as the enemy when judges have so often protected the press and the rest of
society from the branch of government that most often tends to
abuse its power, the executive. Yet journalists, perhaps currently
intoxicated by the notion of press exceptionalism, do often see
judges as enemies. At one conference of journalists, judges, and
142. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1978, at A3, col. 3. The story quotes Prime Minister P.W. Botha as promising legislation to curb "gossip mongering" by forcing
"people or parties," including newspapers, to disclose their sources of information.
143.

The Court said in Branzburg that it was not dealing with "a governmental

institution that has abused its proper function, as a legislative committee does when
it 'expose[s] for the sake of exposure."' 408 U.S. at 699-700 (quoting Watkins v.

United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957)).
144. Rowan, This Supreme Court Doesn't Understand, Wash. Star, June 7,
1978, at A19, col. 6.

145. Kwitny, supra note 110, at 12, col. 4.
146. "[N]ever in its entire history can the Supreme Court be said to have for a
single hour been representative of anything except the relatively conservative forces
of its day." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 187 (1949).

147. The major press victories in the 1970's include: Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). And for two cases
holding that the press cannot be penalized for printing names that appear in court records but are officially designated as confidential, see Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (name of judge under investigation for misconduct), and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (name of rape victim).
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lawyers--occasions that seem to bring out the machismo in
journalists-a judge usually sympathetic to the press listened to the
steady stream of abuse until he could remain silent no longer. He
said:
Where, ladies and gentlemen, do you think these great constitutional rights that you are so vehemently asserting, and in which
you were so conspicuously wallowing yesterday, where do you
think they came from? The stork didn't bring them. These came
from the judges of this country, from these villains here sitting
148
at the table.
Justice Stewart is hardly to be held responsible if the press is
sometimes strident in its own cause, sounding as if its own rights
were central to freedom and all others peripheral. But on the question of confidential sources, which is more troubling to reporters
and editors than any other legal issue, his opinions have embraced
the press' cause. His dissent in Zurcher has been noted. 149 Dissenting in Branzburg, he sounded a major press theme when he
said, "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to
gather news . . . . News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its
source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to
publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right
to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist."1 50
But Justice Stewart's argument that a testimonial privilege
arises from a first amendment "right to gather news" presents a
paradox. For, two years after Branzburg, Justice Stewart wrote the
opinion of the Court in Pell v. Procunier,15 1 holding that the press
has no greater right than the public at large to gather news in a
prison. He relied on the majority's statement in Branzburg that
" 'the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally.' "152 Toward the end of his Yale speech he made
the point again, in words not so welcome to the press: "There is no
constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. . . . The

148. THE MEDIA AND THE LAw 36-37 (H. Simons & J. Califano eds. 1976). Under the rules of the conference, the book does not give the name of the judge it
quotes.
149. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
150. 408 U.S. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
152 Id. at 833 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)).
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Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an
Official Secrets Act."1' 53 Then, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. , 54 Justice Stewart indicated that government could completely exclude
both press and public from jails and other public facilities: "The
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a
right of access to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally."' 155
How can a judge say in one case that the first amendment affords a "right to gather news," and in another that the amendment
does not give anyone "a right of access to information generated or
controlled by government"? How can he tell journalists in one
breath that the Constitution treats them differently from everyone
else, and in the next that they have no more rights than the public? The mystery has a solution, I think, but it requires some exploration.
Based on the precedents, Justice Stewart is plainly right that
the Constitution does not give the press or anyone else a general
right of access to information. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court when it rejected a claim that restrictions on travel to Cuba
violated a right to acquire information, said: "The right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information." 1 56 The most frequently cited judicial affirmation that
such a right exists is Justice White's statement for the majority in
Branzburg that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,"' 157 and only a Pangloss could take much comfort from that reluctant double negative. But it does leave open the
possibility of judicial intervention to prevent the total denial of
public access to public matters, if that extreme should occur-as,
indeed, does the adjective "unrestrained" in Chief Justice Warren's
statement. Imagine, for example, that large numbers of prisoners
in a local prison died under unexplained circumstances and that
the warden persistently refused to allow visits by any outside person: journalist, lawyer, relative, whomever. If an outsider sued for
access, would Justice Stewart say that the Constitution has no application to those facts?

153.

Stewart, supra note 2, at 636 (footnotes omitted).

154. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
155. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).

156. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
157. 408 U.S. at 707.
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The example of the sealed prison suggests that what is at stake
in the prison-access cases is not really a right of journalists. It is,
rather, the principle of our system of government that public institutions must in some way be publicly accountable. Justice Stevens
made the point in his dissent in Houchins: "Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public
institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process of
self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of
58
its substance."'
Access to an institution is not the only way to assure its accountability. In Branzburg the Court noted, by way of showing the
accepted limits on press access, that Supreme Court conferences
have always been closed to press and public;' 59 and it is true that
the Justices could not exchange views candidly and effectively in a
public forum. The exclusion is philosophically acceptable because
the Court is held accountable in another way: in the persuasiveness
of its opinions. But this alternative mode of accountability is not
present in the example of the prison totally closed to public inspection, since conditions, decisions, and actions remain undisclosed.
Nor is there good reason to keep the public ignorant of prison conditions, as there is to maintain the secrecy of court conferences. To
the contrary, as Justice Stevens noted, imprisonment is part of the
criminal-law process, and must be visible to the community if it is
to attract the necessary public confidence. So long as public access
is not allowed to interfere with prison management, Justice Stevens said, "there is no legitimate penological justification for concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens
' 60
are being confined.'
But if public accountability requires some access to a prison,
why should a court grant access to a newspaper or television station rather than, say, a member of the prison reform league? Chief
Justice Burger asked that question at the oral argument in
Houchins. Justice Stevens answered in his dissenting opinion: because in this case the press is the only party seeking access.' 6 ' And
the press represents the public, as Justice Powell said in dissent in
158. 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
159. 408 U.S. at 684. See also Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 559 (1977).
160. 438 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Powell
made the same argument four years earlier. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. 438 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the companion case to Pell, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 1 62 Indi-

vidual citizens today, he said, cannot become personally familiar
with the affairs of government; 163 nor is unrestrained public access
64
often feasible.1

In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of

the public at large. It is the means by which the people receive
that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent
self-government.
• . . The underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's in-

terest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the
165
public's right.
Justice Stewart in fact appears to have moved toward that position. In Houchins, three of the seven Justices who sat would have
vacated in its entirety a district court injunction giving KQED access on special terms to the prison. Three others would have affirmed the district court order. Justice Stewart agreed with the first
three that the station had no right of access to areas or sources of
66
information in the prison from which the public was excluded.'
But where the public was admitted, he said, the press' right of
"equal access" had to reflect "the practical distinctions between the
press and the general public"; 16 7 the press had to have "effective
access to the same areas." 168 Thus he agreed with the district
court-and this became the law of the case' 6 9-that KQED had to
be able to use cameras and sound equipment to show the viewers,
effectively, what individual visitors could see with their own eyes.
"When on assignment," he said, "a journalist does not tour a jail
simply for his own edification. He is there to gather information to
be passed on to others, and his mission is protected by the Constitution for very specific reasons. . . . Our society depends heavily

162.
163.
164.
165.

417 U.S. 843 (1974).
Id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 863-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).

166. 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
167. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
168. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).

169. On remand, defendant sheriff entered into a stipulation that representatives of the news media would be allowed frequent access to most areas of the
prison with their cameras and recording equipment. Stipulation and Order Regarding
Dismissal of Action, KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, No. C-75-1257 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15,
1978).
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623

on the press for .. . enlightenment.- 170 In other words, as Justice
Powell said in Saxbe, the press acts as the representative of the
public.
Protection of the Editorial Process
The decided cases treat two phases of the press' work very
differently. In acquiring information, it has little if any constitutional protection. In publishing, it has great protection: Once the
press gets information, not even strong interests of national security1 71 or privacy 172 or fair trial i 73 justify interference with publishing. But there is something in between: the editorial process. 174 It is a legal battleground relevant to the search for Justice
Stewart's position.
The Supreme Court has said in general terms that the editorial process is entitled to constitutional protection. In Tornillo,
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court that "the exercise of editorial control and judgment" was "a crucial process" from which
i7 5
the first amendment had so far excluded government regulation.
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 176 rejecting the claim
of would-be television advertisers that they had a constitutional
right to buy advertising time, the Chief Justice said: "For better or
worse, editing is what editors are for. ..."177
But the specific reasons for protecting the editorial process
were made clearer in an episode that arose not in the courts but in
Congress. In 1971 CBS produced a television documentary, "The
Selling of the Pentagon," on the Defense Department's public relations techniques. A subcommittee of the House Commerce
Committee, responding to criticism that the producers had unfairly
170. 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
171. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
172. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
173. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
174. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 976-78 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct.
1635 (1979). Chief Judge Kaufman divided the work of the media into acquiring,
processing, and disseminating information.
175. 418 U.S. at 258. Justice White, concurring, said:
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the unhappy
experiences of other nations where government has been allowed to meddle
in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers. Regardless of how beneficentsounding the purposes of controlling the press might be, we... remain intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press.
Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
176. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
177. Id. at 124.
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edited their film footage, subpoenaed the outtakes (the film not
used in the final version); Dr. Frank Stanton, president of CBS,
declined on first amendment grounds to comply with the sub179
poena. 178 The Commerce Committee cited him for contempt.
But the full House, by a vote of 226 to 181, killed the citation.18 0
What that episode showed is that governmental intrusion into the
editorial process may have a chilling effect. Editors are rightly concerned about any official effort to second-guess the editorial process. Inspection of the process by private litigants-the issue in
Herbert v. Lando-seems to me less threatening; and it did not
draw constitutional objection from Justice Stewart.181
Such considerations may explain the apparent inconsistency in
Justice Stewart's words in Branzburg, on the one hand, and in Pell
other. When he spoke in Branzburg of
and his Yale speech on the
"'a right to gather news," 18 2 he may not have meant a right to get
government information against the government's wishes-a right
he denied in later statements. 183 He may have meant, rather, a
right to seek the news without official interference in the process. 184 If one analyzes Branzburg that way, then the grand jury
178. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1971, at 71, col. 1.
179. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
180. 117 CoNG. REc. 24752-53 (1971); N.Y. Times, July 14, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
181. The Second Circuit in Herbert held that the first amendment protects media libel defendants from having to answer certain questions on discovery about
their knowledge at the time of publishing the disputed material; that is, it limited inspection of the editorial process in a civil action. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). The Supreme Court, reversing, observed that
facts about libel defendants' state of knowledge are essential to recovery under the
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which requires proof that a defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.
Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1641 (1979) (discussing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), rev'g 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977). Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that plaintiff had abused discovery in this case by asking questions irrelevant to the criteria of Times v. Sullivan; he would have remanded to the
trial court with instructions to limit discovery. 99 S. Ct. at 1661-63 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
182. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 152-155 supra.
184. But the principle of noninterference in newsgathering, if it does underlie
Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg, is not an absolute for him. He urged only a
qualified testimonial privilege in Branzburg. And in the Farber case, after
temporarily staying the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision until the full Supreme
Court could act, New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 47 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Sept.
26, 1978) (No. A-284), he joined without comment in a vote to vacate the stay, New
York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 886 (1978). Before the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision, stays had been denied by Justices White, New York Times Co. v.
Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317 (1978), and Marshall, New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich,
439 U.S. 1331 (1978).
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subpoena forcing disclosure of confidential sources is like the congressional subpoena for outtakes of "The Selling of the Pentagon."
It is a chilling intrusion---one that, if sustained, could make editors
trim their judgment in the future.
This explanation of Justice Stewart's "right to gather news" fits
a suggestion, toward the end of his Yale speech, that relations between the press and the government should be seen as a contest.
This image was used by the late Alexander M. Bickel, who after
representing the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers Case

wrote that the first amendment "ordains an unruly contest between
the press, whose office is freedom of information

.

. , and govern-

ment, whose need is often the privacy of decison-making."185 Justice Stewart spoke of the press' "autonomy." But autonomy, he
said, "cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle against secrecy
and deception in government. But the press cannot expect from
the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. . . .The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolu186
tion."
Justice Stewart's concept of press "autonomy" is a useful
one-if not limited to journalism but embracing the pamphleteer
and the publisher of Victor Marchetti's book. 187 But there is danger in the other side of the contest theory as Justice Stewart frames
it: the government's right to deny access by press or public to information or institutions that it controls. How far Justice Stewart
would carry that right was indicated when he wrote for the Court
in Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale that "members of the public have

no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials."' 188
CONCLUSION

Blackstone, recording the successful outcome of the long English struggle against press censorship, wrote: "Every freeman has
an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press
185.
186.

A. BICKEL, TaE MOrALITY OF CONSENT 87 (1975).
Stewart, supra note 2, at 636.

187. The CIA learned of Marchetti's book, according to a CIA official's affidavit, from "a confidential source"-evidently someone in one of the six New York
publishing houses to which Marchetti had submitted an outline. See Marks, On Being Censored, FORIGN POL'Y, Summer 1974, at 93, 96.
188. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 99 S.Ct. at 2911. See discussion in note 192
infra.
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"189 Every freeman, that is, not just those organized or

institutionalized as "the press." Freedom of the press arose historically as an individual liberty. Eighteenth-century Americans saw it
in those terms, and the same view is reflected in Supreme Court
decisions; freedom of speech and of the press, Chief Justice
Hughes said, are "fundamental personal rights." 190 To depart from
that principle-to adopt a corporate view of the freedom of the
press, applying the press clause of the first amendment on special
terms to the "institution" of the news media-would be a drastic
and unwelcome change in American constitutional premises. It
would read the Constitution as protecting a particular class rather
than a common set of values. And we have come to understand,
after much struggle, that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."191
The press is not a separate estate in the American system. Its
great function is to act for the public in keeping government accountable to the public. And it would be a poor bargain, for the
press and the country, if a special status for journalism were
accompanied by greater latitude for government to avoid accounta2
bility by closing its proceedings.19
Justice Stewart's idea of a preferred constitutional position for
the organized press was inevitably appealing to journalists, but it
would hurt their real interests if it became accepted doctrine. It
would separate the professional press from the public it represents,
and increase the risk of arrogance. In our complex democracy,
newspapers and magazines and broadcasters usually vindicate the
4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMENTARIEs *152.
190. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
189.

191. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. That is the practical result of Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898
(1979). The Court upheld against constitutional objection by a newspaper company
the action of a New York judge in excluding press and public, at the joint request of

prosecution and defense, from a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence.
Justice Stewart, writing for a five-man majority, said the sixth amendment guarantee

of the right to public trial was for the benefit of defendants and could be invoked
only by them. As to the first amendment, Justice Stewart cited the prison-access

cases, see notes 151, 154 & 162 supra, and said "[s]ome Members of the Court" believe that the press and public could not be completely excluded from prisons "in
the absence of a significant governmental interest." Id. at 2911. (Interestingly, he put
himself in that category by citing his concurrence in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1, 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); see text accompanying notes 166-170
supra.) But even assuming arguendo such a qualified first amendment presumption
of access to criminal trials, he found that in this case there were sufficient counter-

vailing interests to overcome it 99 S. Ct. at 2911-12. The effect of the Gannett deci-
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"'social interest in the attainmel., of truth.' "193 They are at
the
cutting edge. But others play their part: scholars and consciencestricken officials and citizen-critics. The first amendment was written for them, too, and freedom is indivisible. The safety of the

American press does not lie in exclusivity.
sion was to immunize critical aspects of the criminal process in Seneca County, New
York, where the case arose in 1976, from any realistic public accountability. Justice
Blackmun noted in dissent, that in 1976 every felony prosecution in Seneca County
was disposed of without a trial. Id. at 2934 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case the suppression hearing "was the only proceeding at
which the conduct of the police, prosecution, and the court itself were exposed to
scrutiny." Id. at 2933-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dis-

senting) (quoting Z. CHAFEE,

FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
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